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Artikel ini merupakan usaha permulaan kami dalam menyetidik tanggungjawab 
yang diterima ('received responsibility '') oleh anti birokrat di Malaysia. Kami 
kenalpasti empat model yang utama mengenai tanggungjawab birokrat, lalu 
mengkaji secara empirik sejauhmanakah model-model tersebut diterima oleh 
ahli birokrat di Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang. Kami dapati bahawa 
tanggungjawab yang diterima tidaklah terhad kepada mana-mana satu model 
sahaja dan merupakan suatu campuran pelbagai model. Hal ini dibincang dan 
beberapa pelajaran dikenalpasti bagi memahami amalan tanggungjawaboleh 
ahli birokrat. 
THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
This paper is about the political responsibility of bureaucrats in democratic 
government. We use the term bureaucrats to distinguish them from politicians 
in office. Administrators, public servants or civil servants would do just as 
well. Public managers may be a more fashionable term these days, but it 
describes politicians in office no less than bureaucrats: who would deny that 
ministers as political heads of departments are public managers as well? We 
also use the traditional term of responsibility, as it will do just as well as 
comparable terms like duty, morality or ethics. The major question about the 
responsibility of bureaucrats concern their proper relation to the sovereign 
people and the ruling politicians who represent the people in a democracy, or 
the set of norms that should govern that relation; and it is on this that we shall 
focus. Weare concerned, in other words, with the political responsibility rather 
than the functional responsibility of bureaucrats (see Friedrich, 1940, 1960). 
The political responsibility of bureaucrats has increased in importance with 
their increasing role in government. The neat division of functions between 
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Ii . 'ans and bureaucrats, according to which the former determine policy and 
:, ~c~er implement it, has been universally rejected, largely as a result of 
. a ing involvement by bureaucrats in policy formulation. At the level of =~overnment, which we examine in this paper, this has been amply shown 
. arious studies (for example, Morgan and Kass, 1993, Svara, 1999). Our :w: findings (not included her.e) show that this is no .less true in ~enang, ~here 
liticians in office, i.e. councIllors, have o~h~r full~t~me oc~upa~lOns. ThIS has ~ the question of whether and how thIS increasing pohcy Involvement by 
n-elected bureaucrats can be reconciled with democratic government. The 
::.x,nsibility of bureaucrats has thus become a focus of concern and attention 
among students of democratic government. The enforcement of responsibility 
by means of external controls on bureaucrats is obviously important and has· 
received the bulk of scholarly attention. However, the problem of defining the 
responsibility of bureaucrats still remains. That is to say, even when those to 
whom bureaucrats are responsible possess the means of enforcement, the 
question still remains as to what bureaucrats are to be held responsible for. At 
issue are the norms or values for guiding (and evaluating) the performance by 
bureaucrats of their policy role. 
It is debatable whether this evident need for an adequate and workable 
nonnative theory for the guidance of bureaucrats under democratic government 
bas ever been satisfactorily met. What is certain, however, is that the situation 
bas become more complicated and challenging in recent decades. Facing up to 
the policy role of modem bureaucrats, academics have assigned new duties to 
bureaucrats, even to the extent of adding the pursuit and defense of the public 
interest to the latter's other responsibilities. Ruling politicians in many 
countries are demanding more of bureaucrats, including greater enthusiasm and 
support for the policies of the party in power. And the public, which is 
everywhere becoming more organized and vocal, is demanding greater 
transparency and direct responsiveness to its interests. The responsibility of 
bureaucrats has increased both in urgency and complexity under these 
conditions. 
Writers from Barnard (1938: ch. 17) to Waldo (1980: ch. 7) and Cooper (1998) 
have recognized that bureaucrats are subject to multiple and conflicting political 
and other moral expectations. Morgan and Kass (1993) indicate the two main 
lines of scholarly response to this situation. While they stress the need to 
"focus our energies on providing career administrators with a moral framework 
... that enables them to articulate a complex ordering of moral claims that are 
compatible with our constitutional system of government." (p. 187), their work 
represents another kind of worthwhile inquiry that is empirical rather than 
prescriptive in nature. How do bureaucrats actually respond to, or cope with, 
the various normative expectations or pressures facing them? Or what kinds of 
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normative ideas and ideals do they accept as proper guides to their practice? In 
this paper we seek to examine empirically the manner in which bureaucrats 
actually resolve the normative issues about their role and. define their own 
respon.sibility. In other words, we want to ascertain what may be called the 
received responsibility of bureaucrats. 
The received responsibility of bureaucrats at a given time or place, as Simon 
(1985) says generally of social conditions or states, is contingent and cannot be 
known a priori but only through empirical research. Finding out the received 
responsibility of bureaucrats is clearly important because of its 
consequentialness for policy outputs. As one writer on administrative ethics has 
long noted, "it is obvious that the moral standards which enter into the day to 
day conduct of public business leave their mark on the whole working approach 
of the executive branch. That is true even when these standards are ill-defined, 
or inconsistent with one another, or actually incompatible with the logic of the 
constitutional order (Marx, 1949: 1120). Obviously, the received responsibility 
of bureaucrats must be ascertained before it can be evaluated and its need for 
improvement assessed. Understanding received responsibility can also inform 
the normative task of prescribing for bureaucrats. 
THE STUDY 
We are presently engaged in a study of the received responsibility of Malaysian 
bureaucrats. This paper presents our preliminary findings from a questionnaire 
administered to senior bureaucrats in the Penang Island Municipal Council. 
Interviews were also conducted with several bureaucratic heads of departments 
but the results do not modify the main findings of the questionnaire reported 
here. 
By senior bureaucrats we mean all heads of departments and their immediate 
subordinates., i.e. the two levels of bureaucrats in the departments that interact 
most with ruling politicians or councillors. This yielded a total of 21 
bureaucrats from the 9 departments. Departments are generally technical in 
nature and are mostly headed as well as staffed at senior levels by persons 
trained in relevant professions. 
The Penang Island Municipal Council consists of 24 councillors (excluding the 
president). Of this number,.2 are District Officers (federal bureaucrats) serving 
in the state. The 22 politicians from the component parties of the ruling 
National Front consist of 2 from the Malaysian Indian Congress, 4 from the 
Malaysian Chinese Association, 7 from the Malaysian People's Movement (or 
Gerakan) and 9 from the United Malays National Organization. Thus no 
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component party has a majority in the Council. Councillors work through 
committees, of which there are about ten, with each councillor sitting in four to 
six committees. 
Since the abolition of local elections in the sixties, councillors have been 
appointed from among member parties of the ruling coalition in the elected state 
government (see generally Norris, 1980). This departure from the more usual 
practice of direct election does not vitiate the usefulness of Malaysian local 
governments as a venue for investigating the responsibility of bureaucrats in 
relation to ruling politicians. Councillors remain the ruling politicians in 
Malaysian local governments, and councilor local bureaucrats are subordinated 
to them, even though they (i.e. councillors) are, as one of them puts it, indirectly 
rather than directly elected. 
FOUR BASIC MODELS OF BUREAUCRATIC RESPONSIBILITY 
Our investigation is guided and structured by four basic models of the political 
responsibility of bureaucrats. These models are readily discemable as the 
dominant extant models of bureaucratic responsibility in the relevant nonnative 
literature of public administration. They are normative because they impose 
requirements on bureaucrats. They deserve to be called models because they 
impose requirements on various important dimensions of the role (including 
role relations) of bureaucrats and also because the requirements of each model 
are internally consistent. 
We provide below a brief description of these models. Not all of these models 
are fully or consensually specified in the existing literature. Nor is the potential 
conflict among them adequately confronted and resolved. However, it suffices 
for our present purposes to state the essential or distinguishing features of each 
of the models. Broadly speaking, these models also trace a developmental 
sequence in. the development of ideas on the subject of bureaucratic 
responsibility. A later model was developed primarily in response to the 
perceived weakness of an earlier one -- without, however, completely 
displacing it or resulting in the total rejection of the earlier model. Indeed, each 
model has its own particular merits (as well as demerits), which is why support 
for each remains and fluctuates over time and according to political conditions 
(Aberbach and Rockman, 1994). 
The first and earliest model may be called the partisan model, as it requires 
bureaucrats to be partisan (or "responsive") to ruling politicians (Riggs, 1971; 
Rourke, 1992, 1997; Aberbach and Rockman, 1994). Bureaucrats are servants 
of ruling politicians and are expected to further the interests of politicians and 
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the political party in power. This paramount concern pervades and colours aU 
dimensions of the bureaucrat's role, whether in providing policy advice, 
implementing policies or communicating with the public. 
In contrast, the neutral model enjoins bureaucrats to be neutral in relation to 
ruling politicians - in the sense that they should give equal service to whoever 
happens to be in power. A reaction against the incompetence of bureaucrats 
appointed on the basis of partisan-political criteria or the spoils system, the 
doctrine of neutrality paves the way for appointing bureaucrats on performance-
related criteria or merit. The neutral model requires bureaucrats to freely but 
confidentially express their views and tender their best advice on all relevant 
matters without regard to party and other loyalties, implement all policies 
faithfully according to established law and rules and regulations, maintain their 
anonymity and refrain from unauthorized comments and disclosures to the 
public. As in the partisan model, bureaucrats are responsible only to their 
political superiors, but what they are responsible for, or the content of their 
responsibility, clearly differs from the partisan model. 
Displacing the partisan model in the later half of the nineteenth-century Britain 
following the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms (Brown, 1970: ch. 5), the neutral 
model was the receive.d model that the British bequeathed, together with the 
parliamentary form of government, to its former colonies, including Malaysia. 
In the United States, the Pendleton Act of 1883 marked the triumph of 
neutrality over the partisan spoils system. However, in recent years political 
leaders in both Britain and the United States have exhibited tendencies of 
backpedaling towards the partisan model. In Malaysia too, government leaders 
have constantly expressed dissatisfaction with the passive neutrality of 
bureaucrats and demanded greater bureaucratic commitment to its policies as 
well as increased enthusiasm and energy in carrying out its programmes 
(Crouch, 1996: 133). 
Whereas the above two models focus on the upward responsibility of 
bureaucrats to ruling politicians, the next two models - the pluralist and public-
interest models -- require bureaucrats be responsible outward to citizens or the 
public. They are concerned with bureaucratic "responsiveness to the public" 
rather than "responsiveness to elected officials" (Selden, 1997: 32-34; see also 
Saltzstein, 1992; Moore, 1995). They differ, however, in the way the relevant 
public is defined. 
The pluralist model sees the relevant public as consisting of interest groups that 
are concerned with a public decision. Bureaucrats should therefore not only 
consult and listen to interest groups but also seek decisions that enjoy the widest 
possible agreement among affected interest groups. According to Morrow 
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(1987: 165), decisions that "reflect the accommodation of multiple group 
pressures" are both more democratic than rule by the majority through its 
elected representatives and more likely to promote system stability. There is no 
consensus among pluralists, however, as to whether bureaucrats should be 
bound by, and hence defer to, interest-group consensus or agreement (Jordan, 
1990). 
The public-interest model takes a more inclusive view of the public than does 
the pluralist model and enjoins bureaucrats to use their participation in the 
policy process to safeguard and promote the public interest, which the model 
implies may not be adequately served by ruling politicians or interest groups in 
the political system (Jackson, 1988; Wamsley, et aI., 1990). The concept of 
the public interest is fraught with definitional problems and for this reason has 
been an easy target of pluralist critics denying its existence. However, these 
critics may have been too eager to throw out the baby with the bathwater 
(Redford, 1958: ch. 5; Pennock, 1962; Stone, 1988: 14-16). Moreover, as noted 
by Marx above, moral standards can have effect even if they are poorly defined. 
Another problem is that the autonomous championing of the public or, for that 
matter, any interest by non-elected bureaucrats remains highly problematic in 
democratic ideology (Burke, 1986; 1989). Upward responsibility, neutrality 
and anonymity are all compromised by the bureaucrat's independent pursuit of 
the public interest. However, this avant-garde model continues to hold 
attraction for scholars because of dissatisfaction with bureaucratic partisanship 
and bureaucratic value-indifference under the neutral model -- or the fear that 
"the ethic of neutrality is no ethic at all" (Jackson, 1988: 367) - and the danger 
of capitulation to entrenched interests under the pluralist model. 
An important feature of these models (and one that foreshadows our findings) is 
that they are not completely mutually exclusive, even though they are not 
completely compatible either. It is thus possible for bureaucrats to rely on more 
than one model in actual practice. This is why we describe them as basic and 
attempt to investigate the extent of their reception by bureaucrats - as well as 
entertain the hope that examining the actual practice of responsibility by 
bureaucrats may help us to better understand the relationship among the various 
models. 
BUREAUCRATIC RECEPTION OF THE MODELS 
Having explained the nonnative confusion facing bureaucrats and the four basic 
models of bureaucratic responsibility, we now examine whether and to what 
extent bureaucrats rely on each of these models. The data consists of the 
responses of our 21 bureaucrats to various statements expressing the major 
requirements of each model. The multiple statements for each model produce 
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highly consistent responses. Except for the pluralist model, the statements 
concern both beliefs and behaviour. Statements on belief refer to what 
bureaucrats should do, while statements on behaviour refer to what bureaucrats 
actually do. Our data shows that the responses to both kinds of statements are 
also generally consistent with each other. The questions on the pluralist model 
relate to beliefs only, largely because we were unsure (unnecessarily as it turned 
out) whether the council bureaucrats have any significant interactions with 
interest groups. 
The Partisan Model 
The partisan model is largely but not completely rejected. This finding is based 
on the data in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Responses to the Partisan Model 
Responses 
Statement I 2 3 4 5 Ave 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly SC( 
Agree Disagree 
Beliefs 
1. Civil servants should be 
completely loyal to their 0 2 6 6 7 3.( 
political superiors and 
should do anything their 
political superiors ask 
them to. 
2, Civil servants should 
always promote the 0 3 4 10 4 3. 
interests of their political 
superiors and the ruling 
party. 
3. Civil servants are 
accountable (or 1 1 3 11 5 3 
answerable) to their 
political superiors and to 
no one else. 
4. Civil servants should 
not be completely neutral 
3 and impartial but must I 5 8 3 4 
identify with the goals of 
political superiors and the 
ruling party. oJ 
Mean for Beliefs j 
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-- Statement Responses Average 
1 2 3 4 5 Score 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
-Behaviour 
l-
t--" 
-
Behaviour 
rs. While advising 
councilors, I only provide 0 2 2 7 10 4.19 
views and information that 
support their policy 
preferences. 
6. I implement all orders 
of councillors even if they 0 2 3 7 9 4.10 
are not lawful or against 
the public interest. 
7. I only make public 
comments and 0 1 4 11 4 3.90 
disclose information that 
promotes public support 
for the councillors. 
8. When providing policy 
formulation advice, I only 0 5 7 9 4.19 
consider the preferences of 0 
my superiors and nothing 
else. 
Mean for Behaviour 4.10 
The first four statements in Table 1 tap the normative beliefs of bureaucrats 
with respect to the partisan model. The response to the first two statements 
indicates that the partisan model is largely rejected. Statement 3, which states 
that bureaucrats are answerable to their political superiors only and to no one 
else, is ambiguous in that its acceptance would be consistent with both the 
partisan and neutral models. For this reason, and because the neutral model 
may find favour with our respondents, we expect responses to it to be less 
negative, or even not negative at all. Still, their response (average score: 3.86) 
is no less negative than their response to the first two statements. The overall 
mean of 3.66 for beliefs, indicating mild rejection of the partisan model, would 
have been higher but for the bureaucrats' greater ambivalence towards the last 
statement, compared to their reaction to the other three. Bureaucrats appear 
more normatively neutral than antagonistic (average score: 3.19) to the view, 
often urged by state and federal ruling politicians in Malaysia, that bureaucrats 
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"should not be completely neutral and impartial, but must identify with the ... 
goals of the ruling party." The Penang Island Municipal Council experienced 
mainly opposition rule in the days of elected local government, but since local 
elections were abolished in the mid-sixties, it has been in the hands of the same 
coalition that has also continuously controlled the federal and Penang state 
governments. If the reaction to statement 4 in the table indicates only a slight 
disagreement, this should perhaps not come as a surprise under these 
conditions. However, and more to the point, it is still a far cry from a clear 
normative embrace of partisanship. 
With respect to behaviour, bureaucratic rejection of the partisan model is even 
more pronounced than is shown in their normative beliefs. Their responses to 
the four statements (with average scores ranging from 3.90 to 4.19) clearly 
show that bureaucrats do not see themselves as subservient to councillors. The 
overall mean for all four statements on behaviour is a clearly negative 4.10. All 
in all, we feel justified in concluding that the partisan model is largely rejected. 
It is not completely exorcised but it is a poor description of the received 
responsibility of our respondents. 
The Neutral Model 
The neutral model is largely but not completely received or accepted by 
bureaucrats, as can be seen in Table 2 (below). 
The response to the belief statements (mean: 1.92) shows clear normative 
acceptance of the neutral model. The respondents report that their behaviour 
complies even more strongly with the neutral model. The requirements of the 
neutral model with respect to bureaucratic behaviour in policy advising, policy 
implementation, and public comments and information disclosure are reportedly 
strongly complied with by our respondents, yielding a mean of 1.53 for 
behaviour as a whole. Together, these scores constitute strong support for the 
neutral model by our respondents. 
The model's requirement of sole accountability to political superiors is similar 
to that of the partisan model and has already been commented upon. That 
bureaucrats return close to a "disagree' verdict on their sole accountability to 
political superiors is a significant qualification of their reception of the neutral 
model.· This qualification probably stems from the bureaucrats' support (to be 
shown shortly) for the models of outward responsibility, especially the public-
interest model. We conclude that the neutral model is largely but not completed 
embraced by bureaucrats. Nonetheless, of all the models, the neutral model is 
clearly the dominant one accepted by bureaucrats in the Penang Island 
Municipal Council: their acceptance or reception of the neutral model, in terms 
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of both beliefs and behaviour, is higher than their reception of either the 
pluralist or the public interest models. Our respondents generally accept 
political direction, which they see as part and parcel of democracy; however, 
they strongly maintain the image of themselves as neutral professionals. 
Table 2 
Responses to the Neutral Model 
Statement Responses Average 
1 2 3 4 5 Score 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Beliefs 
I. Civil servants should serve their 
political superiors to the best of 8 II 2 0 0 1.71 
their ability, but they must remain 
neutral and non-partisan. 
2. Civil servants should never make 
public comments or disclose 8 9 3 0 I 1.90 
official information without prior 
permission from political superiors. 
3. Civil servants should obey the 
orders of their political superiors 6 II 1 I 2 2.14 
only if the orders comply with 
existing law and regulations 
Mean for Beliefs 1.92 
Behaviour 
4. While advising, I provide views 
and information on all relevant 
matters, even if these do not II 7 2 I 0 1.67 
coincide with the preferences of 
councilors. 
5. I implement policies impartially 
and in accordance with rules and 10 II 0 0 0 1.52 
regulations. 
6. I never make public comments 
or disclose official information 14 6 0 0 0 1.30 
without proper authorization. 
Mean for Behaviour 1.53 
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The Pluralist Model 
The pluralist model is moderately supported by our respondents but only with 
respect to interest group participation in the public decision-making process. 
Deference to interest groups in making public decisions is clearly rejected. This 
is the verdict of the data in Table 3, 
Interest groups are not reported to be very active or powerful in influencing the 
operation of the various departments of the Penang Island Municipal Council. 
However, neither are they non-existent or totally ineffectual. Table 3 shows the 
responses to statements designed to evaluate reception of the pluralist model. 
Unlike those for other models, these statements concern beliefs alone. (Contrary 
to our initial uncertainty, we found that both councillors and bureaucrats 
cbnstitute targets of interest group influence and have to deal with interest 
groups.) The table has two parts, one relating to attitudes toward (or evaluation 
of) interest groups with respect to their role in the policy process and the other 
relating to bureaucratic relations with interest groups in the same process. We 
expect our respondents' beliefs as to their proper relations with interest groups 
to be significantly influenced by their attitude toward interest groups. 
Table 3 
Responses to the Pluralist Model 
Statement Responses Average 
1 2 3 4 5 Score 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
Attitudes toward Interest Groups 
1. Interest groups in society have 
a right to take part in the 
formulation of policies that affect 10 10 1 0 0 1.57 
them. 
2. Interest groups often 
understand public problems better 1 6 6 6 2 3.10 
than politicians and civil servants. 
3. Interest groups are an important 
source of useful ideas for solving 4 14 2 1 0 2.00 
public problems. 
4. The trouble with interest 
groups is that they usually pursue 
their own narrow interests at the 1 10 4 0 0 1.86 
expense of the public interest. 
46 
Kajian Malaysia, Jld. XV/X, No.1, Jun 200 1 
Statement Responses Average 
1 2 3 4 5 Score 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Dis~ee 
Relations with Interest Groups 
5. Civil servants should listen 
to, and establish good working 
relations with, interest groups in 4 13 3 1 0 2.05 
society. 
6. Civil servants should share 
relevant information with 
interest groups to enable them to 2 13 5 1 0 2.24 
playa meaningful role in 
policymaking. 
Attitudes toward Interest Groups 
7. Civil servants should explain 
their actions not only to political 
superiors but also to concerned 3 10 4 4 0 2.42 
groups in society. 
8. The views of interest groups 
should be taken into account but 
must not be allowed to 4 16 0 1 0 1.90 
determine policy. 
9. Civil servants should defend 
the public interest against the 
demands and claims of interest 2 16 2 0 0 2.00 
- groups, 
The first four statements in Table 3 concern what seems to us to be the 
important aspects of bureaucratic attitudes toward interest groups. The rather 
strongly worded first statement elicit responses (average score: 1.57) that 
clearly establish the legitimacy of interest group participation in the policy 
process. Our' bureaucratic respondents strongly acknowledge the right of 
interest groups to participate in the formulation of policies that affect them. 
They also agree that interest groups "are an important source of useful ideas for 
solving public problems" (statement 3; average score: 2.00), thus 
acknowledging that the expertise that interest groups possess in their areas of 
concern can contribute importantly to effective policies and problem-solving. 
However, bureaucrats do not see interest groups as equally useful in the 
logically prior task of understanding and analyzing public problems. The 
statement that interest groups "understand public problems better than 
politicians and civil servants," produce only a neutral or ambivalent response 
(statement 2; average score: 3.10). Their attitude toward interest groups tum 
clearly negative when it comes to the kinds of interest typically pursued by 
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interest groups in the policy process. They show strong agreement with the 
statement that interest groups "pursue their own narrow interest at the expense 
of the public interest (statement 4; average score: 1.86). Our respondents are 
aware of both the positive and negative aspects of interest group involvement in 
the policy process: they can thus be said to have a generally balanced view of 
interest groups. This view is reflected in their beliefs on their proper relations 
with interest groups shown in the second part of Table 3. 
Bureaucrats show mild support for the statements that they "should listen to, 
and establish good working relations with, interest groups" (statement 5; 
average score: 2.05), that they "should share relevant information with interest 
groups to enable them to playa meaningful role in policymaking" (statement 6; 
average score: 2.24), and that they "should explain their actions ... to concerned 
groups" (statement 7; average score: 2.42). All these actions indicate 
bureaucratic acknowledgement of the legitimate stake of interest groups and 
acceptance of interest groups as partners (although not necessarily equal 
partners) in the policy process. The belief of bureaucrats that they should 
perform these actions is not strong, but it is at least positive. 
Accepting interest group participation in policymaking does not mean that 
bureaucrats· believe they should defer to the demands or wishes of interest 
groups. Consistent with their perceived limitations of interest groups, 
bureaucrats clearly believe that the views of interest groups "should be taken 
into account but must not be allowed to determine policy" (statement 8; average 
score: 1.90). Furthermore, they also believe that they "should defend the public 
interest against the demands and claims of interest groups" (statement 9; 
average score: 2.00). 
As noted earlier, current formulations of the pluralist model of bureaucratic 
responsibility are unclear as to whether bureaucrats should be bound by the 
agreement or consensus arrived at by interest groups. It may be useful to 
distinguish between a strong and a weak version of the pluralist model. The 
weak version only provides for interest group participation in administrative 
decision-making, while the strong version further requires that interest group 
consensus or agreement be binding on bureaucrats. Our bureaucratic 
respondents show mild acceptance of only the weak pluralist model: they accept 
participation by interest groups and consider their views but do not defer to 
them in public decision-making. This foreshadows our findings on their 
reception of the public interest model, for how else can bureaucrats (in contrast 
to ruling politicians) justify their right to vet and even reject interest group 
agreement except on the basis of some overriding notion of the public interest. 
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The Public-Interest Model 
The data in· Table 4 shows that the public-interest model receives moderate 
support from our respondents. They promote the public interest but subject to 
the avoidance of open conflict with political superiors. 
Table 4 
Responses to the Public-Interest Model 
Statement 
Beliefs 
1. I am answerable not only to 
political superiors but also to the 
g~neral public. 
2. Civil servants have a duty to 
expose wrongful acts committed by 
persons in public office, including 
their political superiors. 
3. Civil servants should always serve 
the public interest even if it does not 
coincide with the interests of their 
political superiors. 
4. Civil servants should consider the 
public and not their immediate 
political superiors as their final 
"master" in a democrac~. 
Mean for Beliefs _-
Behaviour 
5. When providing policy advice, 
my primary consideration is to 
promote the public interest. 
6. When implementing policies, I 
use my discretion to make them as 
consistent as possible with the public 
interest. 
1 
Strongly 
Agree 
4 
2 
4 
2 
5 
7 
Responses 
2 3 4 5 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
12 2 o 3 
9 8 o 
12 4 o 
II 5 2 o 
9 4 3 o 
12 o 
49 
Average 
Score 
2.24 
2.40 
2.10 
2.35 
2.27 
2.24 
1.81 
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Statement Responses Average 
1 2 3 4 5 Score 
Strongly Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
7. I only implement orders that, in 
my view, are in the public interest. 1 10 7 3 0 2.57 
8. I comment publicly or disclose 
information on policies that I think 
are against the public interest, even 0 0 2 9 9 4.35 
when not expressly authorized by 
my superior. 
Mean for Behaviour 2.74 
With respect to beliefs, our respondents reported moderate support for their role 
in promoting the public interest (as they see it), as indicated by the overall mean 
of 2.27. Statement 1 adds the public but without excluding political superiors 
as the object of answerability. This may have led to greater support than would 
have been the case had the public been held out as the sole entity to which 
bureaucrats are answerable. However, the other three statements on promoting 
the public interest that clearly contrast the public interest with that of political 
superiors received similar levels of support. We therefore conclude that our 
respondents show moderate normative reception of the public-interest model of 
bureaucratic responsibility. 
The public interest is also reported to be a moderately strong source of guidance 
for bureaucrats in their behaviour. Again, although statement 5 is weaker than 
if it stipulates the public interest as the sole and not merely the primary 
consideration for bureaucrats in policy advising, support for it is not 
significantly higher than for the stronger statement 7. The mean for behaviour 
of 2.74, which is noticeably higher (i.e. more negative) than that for beliefs, 
suggests that the public interest is more accepted in bureaucrats' beliefs than in 
their behaviour. However, this difference is solely due to the highly discordant 
and negative response (average score: 4.35) to the last statement in the table. 
We expect bureaucrats who serve the public interest against all else to agree 
with this statement. However, our respondents clearly report that they refrain 
from public comment and information-disclosure on policies that they believe 
to be against the public interest. In this regard, our respondents follow very 
closely the dictates of the neutral model, even though they reportedly promote 
the public interest in other ways. This finding importantly qualifies their 
support for the public-interest model. 
Apparently, acceptance of the public-interest model by bureaucrats does not 
extend to publicly questioning the decisions and actions of their political 
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superiors. Bureaucrats may not regard ruling politicians as necessarily the best 
judge of the public interest; nor do they seem to regard themselves as solely or 
ultimately accountable to ruling politicians. They are not indifferent to the 
public interest and they try to further it as opportunities permit. But more 
important to them is avoiding open conflict with political superiors - and 
presumably also prosecution under the strict secrecy laws currently in force. 
Promoting the public interest in policy advising, exercising their discretion in 
ways that further the public interest in policy implementation, perhaps even 
refraining from enthusiastic implementation of policies they believe to be 
against the public interest - all of which are reported by our respondents - can 
be done in a manner that does not appear to frontally and publicly challenge the 
authority of political superiors. But such a perception, and the wrath of political 
superiors, would inevitably follow if they publicly question or erode public 
support for the latter's decisions. Our respondents accept the public-interest 
model, but this acceptance is subject to the limits imposed by the acknowledged 
right of political superiors to determine policy. Not for them, apparently, the 
whistle-blowing or even unauthorized leaks that a bureaucratic crusader might 
resort to in the name of the public interest. 
A Coherent Hybrid Model? 
Bureaucrats face upwards as well as outwards. They need to develop workable 
ways or norms for relating to both political superiors and society (including 
interest groups), from which different demands and expectations may emanate. 
We did not begin with the assumption that bureaucrats have developed a fully 
coherent model of their own responsibility for themselves, or that they 
necessarily need to. After all, no less an observer than Waldo (1968: 14) has 
long suspected that "we like it both ways, anonymity and neutrality or identity 
and a cause, as suits our purpose of the moment." Whether by "we" he meant 
academics or bureaucrats is unclear, but his statement must surely apply with 
greater force to bureaucrats pressed by multiple and shifting political demands 
and having to reconcile these with their personal and professional values. An 
earlier empirical study in fact found bureaucrats using different and partially 
conflicting models in combination. "Rather than abandon moral claims they 
have acquired at previous stages of their careers," Morgan and Kass (1993: 179-
180) report, "our panelists simply add one set of values to the other and do not 
spend much time constructing a framework to order or to reconcile their 
potential incompatibilities." 
We also find bureaucrats using different models in combination. N one of the 
four models is completely rejected by our respondents. The received model of 
responsibility among our bureaucrats - if it is justified, as it seems to be, to 
speak of a single overarching model -- is a composite or hybrid of all the four 
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models we identified. Historically part of the British colonial heritage, the 
neutral model continues to enjoy the highest level of reception among 
bureaucrats and constitutes the dominant component in their hybrid model. 
Next, and of roughly equal importance, are the pluralist and public-interest 
models. Least important is the partisan model, which is largely, though not 
completely, rejected. The incomplete rejection of the partisan model, 
unsurprising under conditions of one-party dominance, suggests its occasional 
use - or . perhaps more· accurately, occasional compliance with it -- by 
bureaucrats in their relations with political superiors. That our bureaucratic 
respondents combine the various models in their received notion of bureaucratic 
responsibility clearly indicates that they do not see their political responsibility 
purely in traditional upward or formal-hierarchical terms. Upward 
responsibility, in accordance with the neutral model, remains primary but our 
evidence shows clear signs of acceptance by bureaucrats of the weak pluralist 
and public-interest models of outward responsibility as well. 
The combined use of various models raises another question: To what extent, 
and how, has conflict among these models been reconciled in the received 
hybrid model? When models that are at least. partially incompatible with one 
another are used together, we expect the conflict to be "managed" somehow, 
not necessarily to eliminate it altogether but to keep it within tolerable bounds --
for at least two reasons. First, there is a limit to the amount of conflict that 
bureaucrats, as human beings, can tolerate or live with. Second, there is also a 
limit to the level of bureaucratic inconsistency that formal political superiors 
can put up with. 
One method of managing conflict is the simple psychological device of 
compartmentalizing the sequential use of logically conflicting models on 
different occasions. Thus, bureaucrats may veer towards the partisan model on 
an issue that political superiors feel strongly about, or at a particularly pressing 
time faced by political superiors, but revert to the neutral model in "normal" 
administration. Such pragmatism can be rationalized as necessary adaptation to 
their complex and threatening political environment. The general compliance 
reported by council bureaucrats with the frequent particularistic "interferences" 
by councillors, to cite an obvious example from our questionnaire, can be seen 
in this light. (This resort to expediency can and often is criticized as poor 
implementation of existing laws. However, bureaucrats may regard such 
behaviour as a necessary price for reducing conflict with political superiors --
who, for understandable if not always proper reasons, often choose to prefer the 
trees to the forest and intercede on behalf of individual constituents and other 
particularistic interests, including their own. The unmistakable implication is 
that it is not they, i.e. bureaucrats, who should be blamed for the resulting 
weaknesses in implementation.) 
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Our findings strongly suggest that bureaucrats have resorted to yet another, no 
less simple method -- doing away or dropping those conflicting requirements of 
the received models that cause them the most problems in actual practice. Or at 
least, it is as if they have done so, for we cannot be sure whether this is done 
consciously or indeed would be described as such by bureaucrats themselves. 
We would not describe their adaptation of the various models as an expedient. 
Unlike their reported accommodation of the particularistic requests or political 
interferences by councillors, the resulting ideas carry normative force with 
bureaucrats and represent their beliefs about how they should perform their role 
in their political setting; in short, these ideas constitute their received political 
responsibility. 
The adaptation of the models would at least explain why the reception of each 
model is not complete. In each case, the requirement or part of a model that is 
rejected appears to be the one that would be most inconsistent with the 
combined use of these models. Even the dominant neutral model has not been 
spared. Thus bureaucrats normatively accept the neutral model in all its 
important aspects except sole accountability to political superiors, a requirement 
that the neutral model shares with the partisan model. Normatively, acceptance 
of exclusive accountability to political superiors would leave little room for 
serving the transcendent public interest. This "trimuring" of the neutral model 
helps significantly in reducing dissonance for bureaucrats. 
Likewise, the pluralist model is received only to an extent or in a version that 
avoids irreconcilable conflict with the neutral and public-interest models. To 
reiterate our main finding, bureaucrats accept participation in decision-making 
but not determination of decisions by interest groups. Regarded simply or 
weakly as a procedural requirement to consult interest groups and consider their 
views rather than to defer to them in decision-making, the pluralist model is 
readily embraced not only in theory by writers stressing the upward 
responsibility of the neutral model (Burke, 1986: ch. 11) but also in practice by 
most democratic countries where the neutral model is the officially approved 
model (Richardson, 1982). Supporters of the public-interest model should also 
have no reservations against using the pluralist method of consulting affected 
interest groups in the search for the more encompassing public interest. 
Finally, bureaucrats also trim the public-interest model to exclude public 
Comment and disclosure in order to avoid direct or head-on conflict with ruling 
politicians. Professing accountability to the public and not only to councillors 
has obvious potential to cause difficulty, but the most conflict-provoking 
implication of primary accountability to the public, namely adverse public 
comment and disclosure with respect to council decisions, has been excised. 
Bureaucratic actions such as exposing or criticizing publicly, leaking 
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infonnation, or blowing the whistle, on actions that they regard as offensive to 
the public interest would be seen by councillors as blatant challenges to their 
political authority that they cannot afford to ignore. In contrast, bureaucratic 
promotion the public interest in policy advising can be presented or 
camouflaged ~s the giving of honest and objective advice. Indeed, advice on 
the public interest (though not advocacy of it) is easily subsumed under, if not 
the public interest during implementation need not overtly challenge the 
authority of political superiors. It need not even entail a denial of the right of 
political superiors to intervene and set a different course if they are not happy 
with existing bureaucratic perfonnance. Admittedly a full reconciliation of the 
public-interest model with bureaucratic subordination to political authority is no 
easy task. ',Potential sources of conflict still abound, for example in the 
reluctance of bureaucrats to carry out policies and political directives that they 
regard as inimical to the public interest. However, what is important for our 
purpose is that our bureaucratic respondents do try to avoid overt conflict with 
their political superiors and to keep differences within tolerable bounds. 
Weare thus more impressed with the level of consistency than_ with the 
remaining conflict within the hybrid model of political responsibility that our 
bureaucrats have apparently developed for themselves. It is apparent that a 
(perhaps the) central concern shaping the development of the hybrid model is 
the need or desire on the part of our respondents to avoid open conflict with 
their political superiors. Democratic ideology and their subordination to 
politicians in office weigh heavily on council bureaucrats. That councillors are 
not directly elected makes them no less (conceivably even more) eager to assert 
and to establish the reality of their control over bureaucrats. If maintaining their 
authority and control is the primary concern of councillors, coping best 
describes the central concern of council bureaucrats in their troublesome 
relationship. Our findings indicate that bureaucrats have not only tried to cope 
but have done so quite satisfactorily in terms of maintaining a workable 
relationship with their political superiors. 
CAVEATS AND LESSONS 
In this paper, we have reported our findings from a questionnaire. Two kinds of 
limitation are immediately worth noting. First, the data thus consist of self-
reports by bureaucrats (on both their beliefs and behaviour) and do not represent 
actual observation of the behaviour of the bureaucrats concerned. It would not 
be inaccurate to say that what we have obtained and presented are only the 
beliefs of bureaucrats - beliefs about their norms as well as behaviour. And it is 
not surprising that these two kinds of beliefs are highly consistent, as after-the-
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. terpretations of behaviour tend to be highly processed and rationalized to 
(act ~ with current normative views (Nisbet and Wilson, 1977; Ericsson and ~orn 1980). Moreover, this set of beliefs, which we call received 
SilJlO ~ibi1ity, inevitably falls short, to some extent, of reflecting or determining 
:1 behaviour. However, it can be expected to have a strong and persistent 
influence on behaviour and is thus worth identifying. 
Second using questionnaire data to ascertain received responsibility has its 
bazard;. It is clearly conceivable that the natural desire to provide what they 
perceive to be socially approved answers may have affected the responses of 
our respondents. Thus our respondents may have indicated a higher degree of 
rejection of the (nowadays generally disapproved) partisan model than is 
actually the case. In fact, there is some evidence suggesting this from our 
questionnaire itself. 'Yhile bureaucrat~ r~port strong rejection .of the p.artisan 
model in their behaVIOur, they also mdIcated general comphance wIth the 
particularistic requests of political superiors in another part of the questionnaire. 
The same factor may have also affected bureaucrats' responses to the public-
interest model. Besides our failure to state the pursuit of the public interest in 
more exclusive terms, perceived social approval may have caused some 
inflation of the reported support for the public-illterest model. However, it is 
unlikely that the level of reported support for' the public-interest model is 
entirely an artifact of our instrument of data collection. 
A third and different limitation concerns the extent to which our findings can be 
generalized to other Malaysian (not to mention non-Malaysian) bureaucrats. 
Our fmdings from the study of a single local government can only be suggestive 
and are highly so, raising for us the question whether other Malaysian 
bureaucrats have coped in the same manner or fashioned the same received 
model as bureaucrats in the Penang Island Municipal Council. If further 
reminder of this is needed, it is provided by two of our respondents. Our 
questionnaire ends with some space for "any other comments?" Only two 
bureaucrats responded. And both made negative remarks on the party-
appointment (and not election) of councillors and on the calibre of some of 
those appointed. One explicitly compared councillors with members of 
parliament and state assemblies, whom, he noted, are elected and thus "truly" 
represent the public and are "at least accountable" to them. This at least raises 
the question whether council bureaucrats would have supported the' public-
interest model if councillors were not appointed but elected - and, by exte1).sion, 
whether the public-interest model is adopted by bureaucrats working /Under 
elected representatives at the state and federal levels. In fact, the ano~ymous 
referee for this'paper correctly points out that the Penang case, where no single 
POlitical party has a majority of councilors, may not even reflect the situation in 
other states where most local governments are dominated by councilors from a 
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single political party (in most cases from the United Malays national 
Organization), a condition that may incline bureaucrats more towards the 
partisan model. 
Despite (and even in some ways because of) the above limitations, we feel that 
our case study may offer some general lessons on the received responsibility of 
bureaucrats. 
Research on the received responsibility of bureaucrats has not progressed very 
far and the literature, such as it is, shows that no single extant theoretical model 
is likely to comprehend perfectly the actual practice of their responsibility by 
bureaucrats (Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman, 1981; Morgan and Kass, 1993). 
Our findings lend support to earlier findings of the hybrid or composite nature 
of received bureaucratic responsibility. If the embarrassing wealth of 
theoretical models does not suffice to deny total obeisance to any single model, 
then the multiplicity of demands and norms impinging on the bureaucratic role 
in government is almost certain to put paid to any such simplistic expectation. 
We suspect that, in varying degrees, such a situation is likely to hold regardless 
of differences in other conditions and even in political systems, like 
parliamentary ones, with a clearly enunciated and officially sanctioned model of 
bureaucratic responsibility. 
Not only is the exact balance among models received by bureaucrats likely to 
vary, as the research by Aberbach, Putnam and Rockman (1981) shows, but the 
combined use of incompatible models also raises the issue of how bureaucrats 
handle conflict among the models. Some writers have suggested or taken 
positions that imply how this should be done (Miles, 1965; Burke, 1986), but 
the actual handling of conflict by bureaucrats remains an empirical question. 
To investigate this, it appears essential, as we have tried, to identify the various 
requirements or components of each of the models. Only by decomposing each 
of the models into its specific requirements were we able to discover that a 
model is neither rejected nor accepted in toto and to examine the extent to!' 
which specific requirements of each model are rejected or received by 
bureaucrats. 
Last but not least, if the received responsibility of bureaucrats is inevitabl~ 
some contingent balance among competing models and their requirements, thei 
this points to a promising line of further research. It would seem useful tq! 
discover through comparative research the main factors that affect the receive~ 
responsibility of bureaucrats and the relative importance of these factors. Th~, ... ",,:. ' 
balance of competing norms evolved by bureaucrats being variable and affecte 
by these factors, knowledge of these factors and their relative efficacy woul 
seem essential for informing action for moving the de facto balance from ales' 
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to a more satisfactory state. In discussing our empirical findings and their 
applicability to local government bureaucrats in other states and to bureaucrats 
at other levels of government, we have referred mainly to political factors, 
specifically the degree of party dominance, but there are obviously other 
potentially relevant factors, including the professional socialization of 
bureaucrats and their terms of employment, that need to be identified and 
evaluated. 
We offer the following proposition in conclusion: in moving from prescribed to 
received responsibility, the question is not whether but how a balance among 
normative models will be struck, the terms of the balance and the factors that 
influence it. 
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